Two decades ago, before I became a journalist, I used to work as a social anthropologist in the Himalayas. It is undoubtedly an unusual background for a financial journalist. 

    Indeed, whenever I reveal my strange past today, bankers usually either react with horror (what does she know about finance?) or incredulity (why would anyone spend years studying Tajik goat-herders?)

    But a decade later, my years in Tajikistan are suddenly starting to look a whole lot more useful. For one thing that anthropology imparts is a healthy respect for the importance of micro-level incentives and political structures. And right now these issues are becoming critically important for Wall Street and the City, as the credit crunch deepens by the day. 

    Take the matter of risk and remuneration at banks. As my colleague, Martin Wolf, pointed out this week, one reason for the recent excesses of the credit bubble lies in how bankers are paid. For the emphasis on annual bonuses creates crazy incentives for bankers to gamble with client money – particularly since they don't pay back these bonuses if deals later sour.

    However, what is equally interesting is while this bonus system is endemic, it has not produced identical outcomes at the banks. Some (such as JPMorgan and Deutsche) appeared to have ducked the worst of the credit pain, while others (Goldman Sachs) have thrived. However, banks such as Citi, UBS and Merrill are producing mind-boggling losses. 

    Why? Luck, undoubtedly, plays a part. But I suspect at least three other factors might also shed light on the puzzle.

    One is obvious: namely the character of those running banks. In recent years, it has been fashionable in management circles to encourage leaders to delegate. This is a principle Chuck Prince, former head of Citi, for example, appears to have practised (perhaps because there was no alternative, given Citi's gargantuan size). So, famously, did James Cayne at Bear Stearns.

    But one trait most surviving bank leaders share, as one policymaker recently observed to me, is that “they tend to be meddlers – very hands on”. Moreover, many also have another key feature: they have had direct career experience of trading and managing market risk. This has given them an obvious advantage in navigating the credit cycle, since they presumably know what a derivative is.

    Furthermore, men such as Lloyd Blankfein at Goldman Sachs or Anshu Jain at Deutsche, who have risen through trading desks, instinctively tend to view everything in terms of probabilities and risk. That is a different mindset from somebody who has previously worked as a salesman, adviser – or lawyer, such as Mr Prince.

    However, there is a third issue which may be even more important – the culture of power. As far an outsider can tell, Goldman Sachs appears to have retained many of the cultural features of its previous partnership. Employees typically view themselves as being affiliated to the bank, not business line, and there is a strong ethos of shared accountability. As a result, senior Goldman staff appear able to scrutinise the operations of other business units with more freedom than at other banks.

    However, groups such as Citi or Merrill appear to have developed a more hierarchical pattern, in which the different business lines have existed like warring tribes, answerable only to the chief. Moreover, the most profitable tribe has invariably wielded the most power – and thus was untouchable and inscrutable to everyone else. Hence the fact that, in this tribal culture, nobody reined in the excesses of the structured finance teams at Citi and Merrill.

    Now, I fully expect that my e-mail box tomorrow will be full of e-mails from bankers, complaining this three-point account is a gross simplification. No doubt. But what is crystal clear is that if you want to understand which banks will emerge as winners from the current mess, it is no longer enough to look at their computer systems and balance sheets. Now, more than ever, investors need to understand a bank's culture too – and the degree to which it is tribal. As I said, a training in Tajik anthropology is suddenly looking very useful.

    二(er)十(shi)年(nian)前(qian)，當(dang)我(wo)還(hai)沒(mei)有(you)進(jin)入(ru)記(ji)者(zhe)行(xing)業(ye)的(de)時(shi)候(hou)，我(wo)曾(zeng)經(jing)作(zuo)為(wei)一(yi)名(ming)社(she)會(hui)人(ren)類(lei)學(xue)者(zhe)，在(zai)喜(xi)馬(ma)拉(la)雅(ya)地(di)區(qu)工(gong)作(zuo)過(guo)一(yi)段(duan)時(shi)間(jian)。對(dui)於(yu)一(yi)名(ming)金(jin)融(rong)記(ji)者(zhe)而(er)言(yan)，這(zhe)無(wu)疑(yi)是(shi)一(yi)種(zhong)與(yu)眾(zhong)不(bu)同(tong)的(de)背(bei)景(jing)。

    的確，無論我什麼時候講述到那段特別的過往歲月，銀行人士通常要麼是一幅驚駭表情（她對金融能有什麼了解啊？）
，要麼就是一臉的難以置信（怎麼還有人想去研究塔吉克牧羊人？）

    但(dan)在(zai)十(shi)年(nian)之(zhi)後(hou)，我(wo)的(de)塔(ta)吉(ji)克(ke)斯(si)坦(tan)經(jing)曆(li)突(tu)然(ran)開(kai)始(shi)變(bian)得(de)有(you)用(yong)起(qi)來(lai)了(le)。因(yin)為(wei)人(ren)類(lei)學(xue)教(jiao)會(hui)我(wo)的(de)一(yi)件(jian)事(shi)，就(jiu)是(shi)正(zheng)確(que)認(ren)識(shi)微(wei)觀(guan)層(ceng)麵(mian)激(ji)勵(li)和(he)政(zheng)治(zhi)架(jia)構(gou)的(de)重(zhong)要(yao)性(xing)。目(mu)前(qian)

，對(dui)於(yu)華(hua)爾(er)街(jie)與(yu)金(jin)融(rong)城(cheng)而(er)言(yan)，隨(sui)著(zhe)信(xin)貸(dai)緊(jin)縮(suo)日(ri)益(yi)加(jia)深(shen)，這(zhe)些(xie)問(wen)題(ti)逐(zhu)漸(jian)變(bian)得(de)至(zhi)關(guan)重(zhong)要(yao)。

    以銀行的風險與薪酬問題為例。正如我的同事馬丁•沃爾夫(Martin Wolf)最(zui)近(jin)所(suo)指(zhi)出(chu)的(de)，最(zui)近(jin)信(xin)貸(dai)泡(pao)沫(mo)肆(si)虐(nue)的(de)原(yuan)因(yin)之(zhi)一(yi)，就(jiu)在(zai)於(yu)銀(yin)行(xing)人(ren)士(shi)的(de)薪(xin)酬(chou)方(fang)式(shi)。對(dui)年(nian)終(zhong)獎(jiang)金(jin)的(de)重(zhong)視(shi)極(ji)大(da)地(di)刺(ci)激(ji)了(le)銀(yin)行(xing)人(ren)士(shi)，鼓(gu)勵(li)他(ta)們(men)用(yong)客(ke)戶(hu)的(de)資(zi)金(jin)進(jin)行(xing)博(bo)弈(yi)——尤其是即便這些交易隨後出現問題
，他們也不必交回獎金。

    然而，同樣很有意思的是
，雖然這個獎金製度是該行業的通病
，但各家銀行的命運並不一樣。一些銀行——如摩根大通(JPMorgan)與德意誌銀行(Deutsche)——似乎躲過了最嚴重的信貸危機打擊，而高盛(Goldman Sachs)等銀行更是繁榮依舊。然而，花旗(Citi)、瑞銀(UBS)及美林( Merrill)等銀行損失慘重。

    為什麼？無疑，這裏有運氣的成分。但我懷疑


，至少還有其它三個因素，會對我們解開這一謎題有所助益。

    其一很明顯：那些銀行掌門人的性格。近些年，在管理圈中，鼓勵領導人放權已經成為時尚。這似乎是花旗前首席執行官查克•普林斯(Chuck Prince)曾經秉持的一個原則（考慮到花旗的巨大規模
，這也可能是因為他別無選擇）。貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)的詹姆斯•凱恩(James Cayne)也是這樣。

    但是，正如一位政策製定者最近對我提到的
，多數幸存下來的領導都有著一個顯著的特點，那就是：“他們往往是愛管閑事的人——非常事必躬親”。

    此外，很多人還有著另外一個關鍵特點：tamenzaijiaoyijiguanlishichangfengxianfangmiandouyouzhezhijiedegongzuojingyan。zhefuyuletamenyigemingxiandeyoushi，yiduguozhecixindaizhouqi，yinweitamenyinggaizhidaoyanshengpinshiyigeshenmedongxi。

    此外，高盛的勞埃德•布蘭克費恩(Lloyd Blankfein)及德意誌銀行的安蘇•賈殷(Anshu Jain)等人都是從交易部門晉升上來的
，他們本能地會從概率與風險的角度看待一切事物。和那些曾是銷售、顧問或是律師（如普林斯）的領導相比，他們的思維方式是完全不同的。

    但是，還有第三個因素，甚至可能比上述因素更重要——權quan力li文wen化hua。連lian局ju外wai人ren都dou看kan得de出chu來lai
，高gao盛sheng顯xian然ran保bao留liu了le從cong前qian合he夥huo製zhi的de很hen多duo文wen化hua特te征zheng。雇gu員yuan通tong常chang將jiang自zi己ji看kan成cheng是shi企qi業ye的de夥huo伴ban，而er不bu是shi公gong司si掙zheng錢qian的de機ji器qi，而er且qie，這zhe裏li有you一yi種zhong很hen強qiang烈lie的de責ze任ren共gong擔dan風feng氣qi。因yin而er，與yu其qi它ta銀yin行xing相xiang比bi
，高gao盛sheng的de高gao層ceng員yuan工gong在zai審shen視shi其qi它ta業ye務wu部bu門men的de運yun作zuo方fang麵mian似si乎hu有you著zhe更geng多duo的de自zi由you。

    然ran而er，花hua旗qi或huo美mei林lin等deng其qi它ta集ji團tuan似si乎hu發fa展zhan了le一yi種zhong等deng級ji更geng為wei分fen明ming的de製zhi度du
，不bu同tong業ye務wu分fen支zhi仿fang佛fo像xiang是shi正zheng在zai交jiao戰zhan的de部bu落luo，隻zhi服fu從cong最zui高gao首shou領ling一yi個ge人ren。而er且qie，獲huo利li最zui為wei豐feng厚hou的de部bu落luo總zong是shi持chi有you最zui大da的de權quan力li——因而誰也不能碰，也不受他人檢查。因此，在這樣一個部落文化中
，沒有人去控製花旗與美林結構性金融部門的肆無忌憚。

    現(xian)在(zai)，我(wo)完(wan)全(quan)可(ke)以(yi)想(xiang)像(xiang)，我(wo)的(de)電(dian)子(zi)郵(you)箱(xiang)明(ming)天(tian)將(jiang)會(hui)擠(ji)滿(man)來(lai)自(zi)銀(yin)行(xing)人(ren)士(shi)的(de)電(dian)郵(you)，抱(bao)怨(yuan)這(zhe)三(san)點(dian)將(jiang)問(wen)題(ti)過(guo)於(yu)簡(jian)單(dan)化(hua)了(le)。這(zhe)是(shi)毫(hao)無(wu)疑(yi)問(wen)的(de)。但(dan)是(shi)，有(you)一(yi)點(dian)很(hen)明(ming)顯(xian)，如(ru)果(guo)你(ni)想(xiang)要(yao)判(pan)斷(duan)哪(na)個(ge)銀(yin)行(xing)將(jiang)從(cong)目(mu)前(qian)混(hun)亂(luan)的(de)局(ju)麵(mian)中(zhong)勝(sheng)出(chu)，僅(jin)僅(jin)了(le)解(jie)銀(yin)行(xing)的(de)計(ji)算(suan)機(ji)係(xi)統(tong)與(yu)資(zi)產(chan)負(fu)債(zhai)狀(zhuang)況(kuang)已(yi)經(jing)不(bu)夠(gou)了(le)。現(xian)在(zai)，投(tou)資(zi)者(zhe)比(bi)以(yi)往(wang)任(ren)何(he)時(shi)候(hou)都(dou)更(geng)需(xu)要(yao)理(li)解(jie)一(yi)家(jia)銀(yin)行(xing)的(de)文(wen)化(hua)，以(yi)及(ji)它(ta)在(zai)多(duo)大(da)程(cheng)度(du)上(shang)是(shi)一(yi)個(ge)部(bu)落(luo)。如(ru)我(wo)所(suo)言(yan)，在(zai)塔(ta)吉(ji)克(ke)斯(si)坦(tan)人(ren)類(lei)學(xue)方(fang)麵(mian)的(de)知(zhi)識(shi)突(tu)然(ran)變(bian)得(de)非(fei)常(chang)有(you)用(yong)了(le)。